Some Organisations Cannot yet Say where Their Agents Are
On the same day, Shiven Ramji of Okta told ISMG that many organisations lacked basic visibility into which AI agents existed, what they connected to and what they were doing. His account was an executive interview, not a prevalence study, and it supplied no reliable count of unregistered agents.
The condition he described is plausible because an internal agent can be assembled from ordinary components: a model, a workflow tool, an API key and the access of the person building it. No central platform has to declare that a new acting system now exists.
Discovery therefore matters. An organisation needs to associate a consequential agent with a distinct identity, a business owner, a technical custodian, and a current purpose. That record establishes who is accountable for the authority the agent receives.
The decisive restrictions sit in the systems the agent uses. A supplier-onboarding agent may be allowed to read specified registration fields and save a draft record. It need not receive the operations for activating the supplier, changing payment instructions or releasing money. If the business system exposes those operations to the same identity, a prompt telling the agent to avoid them carries too much weight.
The mandate also needs an end. A pilot that quietly becomes a service can retain credentials and queued work long after its original owner or purpose has changed. Expiry, renewal and suspension should reach the sessions and access tokens that can still act, not merely change a status in the inventory.